Cloning? Yuk!
David King
First published in 'Key Issues
on Bioethics: A guide for teachers'
[Levinson, R & Reiss, M.J. (Eds.)] Routledge Falmer, London, 2003.
Introduction
A book
entitled 'Key Issues in Bioethics', clearly should address the subject
of cloning because cloning provides an exceptionally stark example
of the failure of conventional academic bioethics to provide an
understanding of the crucial issues, and of what is at stake. In the
face of overwhelming public opposition to cloning, and a set of
simple and obvious reasons for not permitting it, the real question
is not 'what's wrong with cloning?' but 'what's wrong with
bioethics?'
We are
faced here with a discourse problem. For
reasons that I will expand on, academic bioethics must eliminate
from its discourse any arguments that are concerned with the
historical, social and economic trends that lead to the appearance
of scientific discoveries and technologies, and which determine
their moral and social meaning and impact. Yet it is precisely these
social appreciations of the issue which are expressed in the
entirely valid popular "yuk !" reaction
to cloning.
I will
argue that cloning represents a particularly clear example of a long
term trend: the denaturing and commodification of human reproduction
through its increasing dependence on technology. This trend not only dehumanises
people and ultimately undermines human rights, but is driven by and
reinforces ongoing eugenic processes which, if allowed to proceed
unchecked, will prove disastrous for society.
There is
little that is new in the argument that cloning dehumanises. This point has been made
most convincingly by Leon Kass (Kass, 1997), and much of this
article echoes his concerns.
What Kass' analysis lacks, because
he is a conservative, is a critical understanding of technology
politics, and I will try to remedy this defect here.
The case against
cloning
The reason
for banning human cloning is that it is an especially blatant
example of the trend in Western capitalist societies towards the
denaturing and commodification of human reproduction that I have
already mentioned.
Allowed to proceed unchecked, this trend will produce a
society which most humans alive today would find unliveable. We are on a slippery
slope. The slope began
about 400 years ago, began sloping downwards more steeply about 100
years ago, took a major dive around 40 years ago, and with cloning
threatens to become precipitous. The nature of slippery
slopes is that people only notice they are on them and react when
there is a change in the gradient. This is why there is such a fuss
about cloning.
The trend
I am referring to can be described most simply as the reconfiguring
of human reproduction as a capitalist industrial production
process. It is just one
example of a broader process which is constitutive of capitalist
societies, and is conventionally described as progress: the
dismantling of all barriers to the exploitation and control of
nature and the reconfiguration of natural processes according to the
model of commodity production and trade. That is
why I dated the origins of the cloning crises to the Scientific
Revolution of the seventeenth century and the beginning of modern
capitalism.
What makes
cloning an especially clear example of the industrialisation of
reproduction is, of course, the fact that it can mass-produce
genetic uniformity, according to the Fordist model. Whereas sexual reproduction
results in newness, variation, unpredictability and uniqueness,
cloning produces sameness, predictability and control. It is this feature which
decisively distinguishes cloning from in vitro fertilisation (IVF)
and other technologies that assist sexual reproduction. The unnaturalness of
cloning, its impossibility in the normal course of biological
events, and the novel biological, social and ethical consequences of
breaking biological rules, mean that it is qualitatively different
from IVF, and so should be our reaction to it.
One
biological consequence of this rule-breaking is the high death rate
and the 'big offspring phenomenon' observed in cloned animals
(McEvoy et al., 2002, Chavatte-Palmer et al., 2000). This appears to spring
directly from the rule that mammals shall have one male parent and
one female, and that reproduction shall occur through the union of
haploid cells produced by meiosis. (These problems with human
cloning are the main, official, ethical barrier to cloning.) The rules of mammalian
reproduction arise from the integrated character of biological
processes, which have been tuned by billions of years of
evolution. Faced with such a clear result of breaking natural laws, it
is not surprising that people complain that cloning is unnatural and
question scientists' drive to dismantle all natural constraints,
whatever the cost.
Kass and
others have argued convincingly that the new genetic uniqueness that
results from the randomness of sexual reproduction is a crucially
important and constitutive aspect of being human. (It should be noted that
monozygotic twins do not refute this principle; they merely provide
a minor exception to it - identical twins' genotypes arise randomly,
not calculatedly, and are new compared to any previous human
genotypes, including their parents.) The fact that we are new,
unknown and different from anyone who has gone before commands
respect and equal treatment: it compels others to take us for what
we are, and not to imagine they have the measure of us. This is
an important part of the basis of human rights.
A more
important aspect of producing humans, rather than conceiving them,
is objectification.
Whereas sexual reproduction gives rise to human subjects,
cloning produces objects: rather than arising from a random, natural
process over which we have no control, clones are the products of
human design (more strictly, selection). This can only put them in a
subordinate position relative to their selector/designer, a position
that corresponds to that of an object vis a vis a subject. The selector, who chooses
which genome to replicate, assumes total control of another human
being's genetic essence.
With cloning, although we do not yet design the genome, as
would the genetic engineer, we have a degree of control much greater
than is available to a genetic engineer working with
sexually-conceived embryos.
Unlike prenatal genetic testing, a form of 'negative control'
where we simply choose to consign certain future people to
non-existence, cloning is a form of positive control over the entire
content of an individual's genome.
I would
argue that this objectification would undermine the clone's ethical
status vis a vis all other humans, not just their
parent/designer. Of
course, cloned humans should, in theory, be treated as persons, like
any other. But clones
will be compromised in that crucial feature of human subjecthood
that determines our ethical relationship with them. A human subject
is simply unconditionally herself, equal and other to us and
belonging only to herself: she must be treated as an equal, with her
own interests. As
objects, clones will not belong to themselves. Perhaps the ethical status
of clones would be somewhat more like that of farm animals, whose
reproduction is rigorously controlled by their superiors. By
imagining how we would react to, say, 50 clones of the same person
it is easy to see how the industrial character of their origins
would erode the ethical seriousness with which we would relate to
them. I would contend that this is no less the case with a single
clone. One might say, following Marx, that if the control by others
of one's labour power produces alienation, then how much more so
would the control of one's genome and the incorporation of one's
genetic being into the production process.
The
replacing of natural means of reproduction with technology is also a
eugenic trend, for as it becomes more technological, reproduction
and its products must conform more and more to
industrial/technological criteria of predictability/uniformity,
quality control and efficiency. Although it has often been
misunderstood as a right wing phenomenon, eugenics, in its heyday,
was supported by many liberals and leftists, who viewed it as
modern, humane and progressive. What united their vision
with right-wing authoritarians was a vision of social control
through regulation of the unpredictable mess caused by
reproduction. In its
essence, eugenics is the capitalist project of control of nature
applied to human reproduction (King, 1997), and has always depended
for its realisation upon medical and technological intervention in
reproduction. This
began with sterilisation, family planning/contraception and abortion
and intensified through IVF, prenatal screening, preimplantation
genetic diagnosis and now cloning. The often-predicted goal of
this progression is the complete separation of sex from
reproduction, and an artificial reproduction with gestation in vitro
and genetic engineering.
The
technologisation of reproduction is also necessary for another form
of distortion:
commercialisation.
This is already evident in the buying and selling of babies
in commercial surrogacy, and the selling of eggs from 'genetically
superior' women on the internet. Several putative cloning
companies aim to charge up to $200,000 per cloned baby. But in cloning the degree of
technical intervention involved makes not only the process but also
the product, a human embryo, patentable. Several companies have now
claimed cloned human embryos as their intellectual property. Human
embryos become, literally, commodities to be bought and sold. One
does not have to believe that embryos are persons (I do not), to
feel that this degrades the dignity of human life.
In
summary, I have argued that cloning is the latest step in the
techno-eugenicist, capitalist trend in human reproduction. Trying to control
reproduction to such a degree, according to criteria that are alien
to it, can only do violence to its biological and social function -
the creation of unique human subjects. Cloning turns us from unique
subjects to be accepted unconditionally into designed, produced and
selected objects, to be bought, sold and judged according to eugenic
criteria.
Dehumanisation does not seem too strong a word.
Is it any
wonder that people cry out, inarticulately, 'Yuk!' at this
distortion of their basic structures of meaning and human
values? Is it any
wonder that they decry the unnaturalness of cloning, and deplore
those who want to control life in this way, and set themselves up
over it, as 'playing God'?
Our bioethicists are by now well-practised in the art of
debunking these unphilosophical expressions of outrage, pointing out
the many ways in which we already play God, and how our concepts of
what is natural are socially constructed. But what ordinary people
see, and our clever experts miss, because they are themselves so
deeply a part of the technocratic enterprise, is the degrading
overall trend. And the
whole point of that trend is limitless control, and its method is
the dismantling and exploitation of the natural. That trend must be stopped
at the point of cloning, for if we fail to control it, its control
of us will become unbreakable.
We are at one of those points on the slippery slope where,
bioethicists always insist, it will be possible to dig our heels in
and say, 'thus far and no further'. We must do so, and the bioethicists should muck in and
help.
Some more detailed
arguments
The psychology of clones
In the
cloning debate there has been much talk of the psychological
problems of clones.
Kass, in time-honoured conservative fashion makes much of the
problems caused by subversion of the normal patterns of
kinship. Others have
talked about the problems of lack of genetic uniqueness, and being
expected to conform to your genetic heritage. It certainly does not seem
implausible that, as with some monozygotic twins, the genetic
sameness will be reinforced with an attempt to impose an environment
and experiences that reinforce the genetic sameness. This is especially obvious
with the stereotypical egomaniac self-cloner, but is likely to be an
unconscious part of the behaviour of all cloning parents, unless
they make a positive effort to do otherwise. A genetic copy of a father
is likely to have his genetic predispositions reinforced in the
nicest possible way.
All parents do this to some degree, but the tendency seems
likely to be considerably more pronounced with clones. The very fact of
objectifying a person in this way, and of placing oneself in the
position of designer, will tend to encourage this. As Kass says, where ordinary
parents have hopes, cloners will have expectations. And knowing that the content of
your genome is known and predetermined in advance, that you are in
the subordinate position of designed object, is hardly likely to
enhance a child's resistance to parental domination - unless it
produces extreme rejection of the parent.
While very
real, these concerns are hard to evaluate. Cloning would interfere with
fundamental aspects of the human condition: kinship, genetic
uniqueness and subjecthood.
Twins often have psychological challenges, but they do not
have to cope with the added difficulties of radically disturbed
kinship, and being a designed object. However, human psychology is
complex and experience has surely taught that people can make the
best of many kinds of bad job.
We cannot predict exactly how the parents of clones will
behave. In my view
concerns about psychology are not a decisive objection to human
cloning, however, we can surely say that this is a very bad job to
have to make the best of.
Cloning is likely to produce alienation in the psychological
sense of the word.
British law requires the
regulator to consider the welfare of the child in deciding whether
to permit the use of IVF - it seems unlikely that cloning would pass
this test.
Clones aren't real copies (so
there's nothing to worry about)
In the
wake of the Dolly furore, many experts were keen to assure us that a
clone of Mel Gibson would not be another Mel Gibson. The clone's pre- and
post-natal environment and experiences would produce a different
person (Lewontin, 1998).
This is, of course, true, as far as it goes and indeed
cloning cannot produce the same uniformity as an industrial
production line. But,
as identical twins show us, genes really do matter, which is why
would-be cloners are so keen to replicate them. Few scientists would now support
the 'blank slate' model of human beings of the 1950s.
However,
the real fallacy in this argument is the same as that involved in
the objection that twins are clones and that there is no problem
with twins (Bailey, 1998).
The objection is not to sameness per se, but to its attempted
imposition by outsiders, especially when this is part of a larger
trend of rewriting reproduction according to an industrial
script. Actions
are made illegitimate not only by their consequences but by the
motivation of the actors and the contexts which frame them.
Reproductive liberty
It is
often argued, especially in the USA, that people have a 'right to
reproduce in any way they want', which is reinforced by a strong
belief that the state has no role to play in personal matters such
as reproduction. There
may be a 'negative right' of non-interference in one's right to
'marry and found a family' as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights puts it.
However, that is a very different thing from asserting a
positive right of access to any technological means necessary to
have a child, simply because one happens to want to use a particular
reproductive method, no matter what the consequences for the child
or for society. (I
would suggest that the inability to recognise this obvious
distinction is due to the pervasive influence of an individualistic
consumerist ethic, which insists that we have the right to anything
we want and no-one shall be allowed to interfere with our pursuit of
our desires.) The point
is that there is no right to have a child if doing so, in any
particular way, violates important social goals. We cannot pretend that
reproduction exists in some inviolable bubble immune from normal
considerations - it has always been a highly social activity,
subject to innumerable social and cultural constraints.
Cloning is inevitable and cannot
be banned
In the
public discussion on cloning, it is often suggested that there is
some inevitability about cloning, and that attempts to ban it are
futile. This is usually based on the idea
that 'you can't stop science', or that nations cannot prevent the
actions of maverick 'mad scientists'.
Strictly
speaking, of course, this is not an argument about whether it is
right to try to ban cloning, however it does deserve attention
because it is factually incorrect, and has a major impact on the
debate. Science is
anything but a juggernaut, proceeding inexorably according to its
own internal logic, in a social vacuum. The agenda of scientific
research is driven by many social factors, especially economic
competition between nations and companies. Science with little
commercial applicability rarely happens, because it does not get
funded. It is ironic
that those who believe that 'you can't stop science' present
themselves as wise to the ways of the world, yet understand so
little of how science really works. It is they, not those who believe
cloning can be banned, who are the naïve idealists.
As for the
maverick scientist, cloning events may or may not take place before
there is a global ban, with severe penalties attached. In my judgement they will
not, because the technical difficulties will delay success until
after a ban is passed.
But even if I am wrong, there is a major difference between a
world in which an isolated cloning event occurs, and the cloner goes
to jail, and one in which cloning becomes an accepted economic
activity. Since I
prefer the former scenario I will continue to lobby for a ban. At present the United
Nations has taken up the call, and there is every reason to believe
that cloning will be banned worldwide by 2005. At the national level, in response to a perceived threat,
legislation can be passed in days.
It is
interesting to ask why people seem so keen to proclaim themselves
powerless. The
often-voiced sentiment that 'you can't stop progress' reveals our
postmodern ambivalence towards the capitalist technocracy that
dominates our lives. On
the one hand, we have stopped believing in anything, especially our
own ability to change the world for the better, and we are rightly
sceptical about dominant narratives of progress: the fashionable
pose is a worldly-wise cynicism. On the other hand, we cannot
altogether give up our belief in progress, and can only hope
desperately that more technology will bring something better. So we accept
technologisation uneasily, feeling alternately hopeful and
victimised, but always powerless in the face of technocracy.
Cloning should be allowed for
infertility treatment
In most
people's eyes, the most serious reason for permitting cloning is for
infertility treatment for those who lack sperm or eggs. It is a measure of how far
we have fallen under the spell of the moral blackmail of the
infertility industry, that we are prepared to entertain this. Firstly, why do we no longer
question the assumption that people must have children that are 100%
genetically related to (in this case only one of) them? Why can such couples not accept
sperm or egg donation or adoption as alternatives?
More
importantly, we must resist the moral blackmail. We must insist that the
relief of infertility does not justify crossing a fundamental
barrier, which will have drastic consequences for humanity. Any
bioethics worthy of the name must be able to insist that medical
advancement does not justify any
means.
How many clones are too
many?
An
argument that has had little airing but in my view is very powerful
is to ask the following questions of those who would accept cloning:
how many clones of one person should be permitted, and on what
basis? Even the most
ardent libertarian advocates of cloning tend to balk at the idea of
making 50 or even ten copies of one person, yet on their own
arguments there is little justification for such scruples. As soon as one starts to
argue that ten clones are not acceptable, one is forced to accept
that there is something inappropriate about creating humans by
simple replication and that this might have harmful consequences for
society. But where does
one draw the line, and on what basis? Why would it be acceptable
to create two copies, but not three or six? The only remotely plausible
place to draw the line is at one copy of the individual, so that the
clone is not too different from ordinary humans. Yet even this would be
vulnerable to the argument that twins and some triplets are clones,
so what's the problem in making two or three clones? Aside from the philosophical
difficulties, the supporters of cloning will have to show how, in
practical terms, they would prevent multiple cloning once cloning
was permitted. In fact,
multiple cloning would be likely to happen immediately, because if
IVF practice were followed, as would likely be necessary given the
highly inefficient and experimental nature of cloning, at least two
or three cloned embryos would need to be implanted.
What's wrong with
bioethics?
Although a
few bioethicists have taken strong positions opposed to cloning, the
majority of Anglo-American bioethicists including the US National
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC, 1997) have been unable to see
strong reasons for not permitting cloning, beyond safety concerns
which are expected to be temporary. I would suggest this failure
reveals something significant about bioethics itself.
The main
failing of contemporary Anglo-American bioethics is its apparent
treatment of issues in a social vacuum. I have been unable to find
any discussion of cloning that sets it in the proper social and
historical context.
Conventional academic bioethics also appears to have a rule
that arguments about societal concerns can barely be mentioned, and
can certainly never override its key concern for individual
autonomy. The excessive
stress on autonomy (especially in the USA) and the exclusion of
consideration of social impact give us a clue that academic
bioethics is far from attaining the 'apolitical neutrality' it
claims. In fact, what
we are dealing with in bioethical debates are discussions between
different strands of liberalism. Amongst political ideologies,
liberalism has always succeeded best in portraying itself as 'simple
common sense', and as not reflecting any particular set of social
interest groups.
What is
interesting is the way that bioethics' stance of political
neutrality, and its exclusion of social analysis, exactly parallels
the liberal ideology of science itself, whereby science is
supposedly objective, neutral and divorced from social and political
influences. This
self-image is vital in allowing scientists not to notice the ways in
which science serves the interests of capitalism, in a hundred
subtle and less subtle ways.
It would appear that the same trick of self-deception works
even in discussions, which, unlike science, are supposed to be about
values.
I would
argue that the reason that official bioethics fails to interrogate
the long-term techno-historical trend (or slippery slope) is
precisely because of its role within that trend. It has succeeded in
constructing a liberal discourse that excludes issues of social
power and how it is exercised, for example through control of
technological agendas.
But by failing to fundamentally critique biomedical
definitions of progress, it has become slave to the biomedical
paradigm. The
traditional critique of liberalism is as true of bioethics: those
who fail to critique power end up serving it.
This does
not mean that bioethicists slavishly follow a party line dictated to
them by scientists, or that all bioethicists are simple spin doctors
for biomedical technology and the vested interests behind it. Bioethics has space for the
most earnest and well-meaning liberals, who take ethics just as
seriously as they should be.
In fact, debate is encouraged, and the fact that it takes
place, albeit on an 'expert level' supposedly beyond the
understanding of the public, is always given as the main reason that
the public should be reassured: 'Don't worry, we've set up an ethics
committee and our experts are looking into it'. Of course, as is often
remarked, such committees substitute for real public debate. But the key point is that
these expert discussions are always subject to the structural
constraints of the bioethics discourse. The exclusion of issues of
power and social control means that, at least in Britain and the US,
bioethics has achieved the status of neutral arbiter and protector
of values.
Bioethicists, but never critical
sociologists, are allowed to advise government.
However,
the problem with the discourse and role chosen for bioethics, as
many commentators have noted, is its inability to ever say no, on
the basis of firm values.
With cloning, as with successive developments on the
biomedical slippery slope, it is always impossible to find consensus
against the latest step in eugenic commodification. As Kass notes, although we
are always reassured that each step is acceptable, because we will
be able to say no to something worse further along, when that thing
arrives we are shamelessly told that we have already accepted, for
example IVF, so how can we object to cloning? Within the unquestioned
ideology of progress, resistance is ascribed to inconsistent
irrationality and a fear of the new, which will doubtless fade away
in time.
In 'The
Communist Manifesto', Marx remarks that the experience of life in a
capitalist society is that 'everything solid melts into air'. This does not 'just happen'
by itself - there is a well paid and intelligent group of people
whose job is to make sure that it happens. It is ironic in the extreme
that this same group of poachers has taken upon itself the role of
gamekeeper and has succeeded in convincing us that the problem is
'Science running out of control, while ethics strives to put on the
brake'.
Nowadays, the
solution to every problem is to set up an ethics committee, but
somehow no-one ever notices how little braking power these
committees seem to possess.
We can, with justification, ask them the following question:
if they cannot bring themselves to say no to cloning, what will they
ever say no to?
Please note: the views expressed in this
article are Dr King's personal opinions, and do not represent the
policy of Human Genetics Alert.
References
Bailey, R. (1998) The twin paradox: what
exactly is wrong with cloning?, in: McGee, G. (Ed.) The Human
Cloning Debate (Berkeley, Berkeley Hill Books).
Chavatte-Palmer P, Heyman Y, Renard JP, (2000) Cloning
and associated physiopathology of gestation Gynecology Obstetrics
and Fertility 28 pp633-642.
Kass, L. (1997) The wisdom of repugnance, The
New Republic, June 2, pp 17-26.
King, D.
(1997) Eugenic tendencies in modern genetics, in: Sutton, A. (Ed)
Man Made Man (Dublin, Four Courts Press).
Lewontin, R. (1998) The confusion over cloning,
in: McGee, G. (Ed.) The Human Cloning Debate (Berkeley, Berkeley
Hill Books).
NBAC (1997) Cloning Human Beings (Rockville,
Maryland).
McEvoy,
T.G., Sinclair, K.D., Young, L.E., Wilmut, I., Robinson, J.J. (2002) Large offspring
syndrome and other consequences of ruminant embryo culture in vitro:
relevance to blastocyst culture in human ART. Human
Fertility 3 pp238-246.
Further Reading
Andrews, L.B. (1999) The clone Age: adventures
in the new world of reproductive technology (New York, Henry
Holt).
Buchanan, A., Brock, D.W., Daniels, N. and
Wikler, D. (2000) From chance to choice: genetics and justice (New
York, Cambridge University Press).
Appleyard, B (1998) Brave new worlds: staying
human in the genetic future (New York, Viking).
Kolata, G. (1998) Clone: the road to Dolly and
the path ahead (New York, Morrow and Co.)
Maranto, G. (1996) Quest for perfection: the
drive to breed better human beings (New York Scribner).
Nussbaum, M.C. and Sunstein C.R. eds (1998)
Clones and clones: facts and fantasies about human cloning (New
York, Norton 1998)
Pence, G.
ed. (1998) Flesh of My Flesh : The ethics of cloning humans : a reader
(Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham MD).
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